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11 Introduction
Rational Choice Theory (RCT, henceforth) is based on preference-driven,
internally consistent, optimizing behaviour. Individuals choose optimal elements
from their choice sets accordingly with their exogeneous preferences which may
take into account several psychological factors (like regret, risk aversion etc...)
or behavioral norms (like empathy or altristic motives). Individual preferences
are assumed invariant with respect to everything not included in preference￿ s
description and internally consistent. Internal consistency of choice is usually
de￿ned by two properties: contraction consistency (i.e. choosing an object from
a given set of choice implies to choose the same object from any proper subset
of choice) and expansion consistency (i.e. choosing an object from a given
intersection of choice sets involves to choose the same object from the union of
these sets). Whereas choice sets are ￿nite, there properties are necessary and
su¢ cient conditions for the binariness of the choice function and this allows to
rationalise behaviour through choice using a revealed preference argument (Sen
(1994a)).
In last decades, many re￿nements of RCT have been undertaken by
scholars as well as many alternative approaches have been suggested by hetero-
dox economists and social scientists. Among the former, a particularly crucial
issue has been how to explain complex decision makings in which many or-
der relations or evaluation criteria are used by individuals. In this perspective,
Ehrgott (1998) proposes a multi-criteria decision making theory mainly based
on the evaluation of an alternative through a multi-attribute value function that
maps alternatives on the Reals with respect to n criteria. More recently, Kalai
et al. (2002) provide a multiple rationales theory in which any decision maker
is endowed by k order relations through which behaviour may rationalized. In
fact, these rationalization methods are context free, in the sense that they do
not make use of information other than choice behaviour. Thus directly or indi-
rectly, they are linked with the hicksian preference theory explaining behaviour
throught order relations/criteria totally determined and controlled by individual
will, attitudes and desires2.
Exactly removing this hicksian assumption, other scholars have sug-
gested theories in which peers pressures or causal conditions of choice (i.e. the
degree of freedom of choice, individual identities, social positions) may strongly
in￿ uence individual desires, will and behaviour. For instance, Harsany￿ s (1977)
and Broome￿ s (1994) extended preference theory mainly focused on personal,
causal and environmental conditions of choice. As it will clearer below (see
Section2), they starting idea is to extend preference relation￿ s domain from sets
of alternatives to sets of vectors formed by an object and a causal condition of
choice. Even if, as stressed by Puppe (1995) and Gravel (1998), some problem
2Other recent papers on RCT in an hicksian approach are: Podinovski and Podinovski
(1998) for a decision analysis under partial information; Nehring (2000) for a theory of rational
choice under ignorance; Ray and Zhou (2001) and Quesada (2002) for an analysis of rationality
in strategic games.
2of basedness between this extended preference relation and its related binary
relation over alternatives do emerge, this approach has been a useful starting
point in investigations about how contexts of choice a⁄ect human behaviour.
Not surprisingly, di¢ culties in building extended preference orderings
have left rooms to other theories of socially complex choice behaviour. Among
other, collective preference theory recently proposed by Sudgen (2000) and dis-
cussed by Gilbert (2001) deals explicitly with non-individualistic choices. Indi-
viduals are here supposed to belong to teams or groups with collective objectives,
group preferences and joint commitments. Nevertheless, these collective prefer-
ences are not reducible to a set of correlative individual preferences and hence
they do not rationalize behaviour other than formal groups￿ one (like football
teams or armies).
However, contexts of choice may in￿ uence choice behaviour in a more
subtle way through informal and cultural norms, traditions or individualistic
moral obbligations. Exactly formthis viewpoint, Sen (1994) introduces a din-
stinction between culmination outcomes (i.e results of choice) and comprehen-
sive outcomes valued not only with respect to chosen alternatives, but also with
regards to the act of choice and its coherence with something external to the
choice itself (like agency of choice, menø of choice, urgency of choice or chooser￿ s
social position). His main result is that with menø (or chooser) dependent pref-
erences (i.e. di⁄erent preference orderings with respect to di⁄erent choice menø
or di⁄erent choosers) binariness of choice is not veri￿ed and traditional revealed
preference arguments cannot be applied. Thus, menø (and chooser) depen-
dency of preference orderings have shown that human decision making must be
viewed as a contextually embedded process and external consistency with some
normative values or factors has to be seek in order to explain individuals￿ choice
behaviour. In this perspective have to be read, in order to appreciate authors￿
￿ndings, Munro and Sudgen￿ s (2003) reference-dependent preference theory and
Katzner￿ s (2002) culturally-determined choice theory. As it will be more deeply
discussed in next section, both theories consider how chooser￿ s starting con-
ditions in￿ uence choice behaviour using respectively preference structures and
preferences over extended alternatives.
In what follows, we provide a contextually embedded choice theory built
using analytical tools of poset mathematics 3. Surprisingly so far, fews contri-
butions in which this theory is applied to choice problems exist. Some papers
on the structure of non-representable preferences (see Beardon et al. (2002)
or Candeal et al. (1998)) or on path dependency of choice functions (Johnson
and Dean (2001)) are remakable exceptions. Nevertheless, as best as we know,
no contributions have made use of these tools to model culturally or socially
embedded rational choices. The theory here presented has exactly this feature
investigating on preferences￿changes within di⁄erent contexts of choice. The
essay is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some recent articles which deal
3For an introduction to these mathematical tools see Davey and Prestley (2000).
3with contextually embedded rational choices and external consistency of choice.
Hence, Section 3 presents preliminary de￿nitions and concepts from poset the-
ory used in the rest of the paper. In Sections 4, 5 and 6 our main results are
presented and discussed, while Section 7 traditionally concludes.
2 Embedded Choices: literature review
As stressed above, several contributions have raised questions to main-
stream RCT from di⁄erent perspectives and using di⁄erent theoretical tools.
For sure, this hasn￿ t make easier the debate. However, what after all has been
accepted among sholars is that individual choice behaviour cannot be deeply un-
derstood if cultural, social and positional in￿ uences are ignored. Among other,
Amartya K. Sen has argued
against the neoclassical approach to choice and behaviour showing the inescapable
need to go beyond the internal features of a choice function to understand its cogency
and consistency (Sen, 1994a, p.497, italics added).
His methodological appraisal may be fully appreciated only if philosoph-
ical linkages with his concept of positional objectivity (Sen (1997), Sen (2002))
are fully recognized. Roughly speaking, beliefs and alternatives￿evaluations are
objective not if they are context free (a sort of view from nowhere) but whereas
they are consistent with agents￿ position within groups, communities or societies.
Hence, modeling context dependency of preferences may be meaningful since:
in many circumstances [...] there is no way- internal to the choice function- of
determinating whether a particular behaviour pattern is or is not consistent. The
necessity of bringing in something outside choice is the issue. (Sen, 1994a, p. 498)
As Sen recognizes, quoting Davidson (1980), what has to be brought
in are: ￿ desires, wanting, urges, promptings and a great variety of moral views,
aesthetic principles, social conventions, public and private values￿ ; in short,
anything that determining contexts of choice and choosers￿identity and/or social
position. An example may be used to show how richer information about the
context of choice may explain apparently irrational behaviour.
Example 1: Mangos, Apples and Kindness (Sen (1997))
Suppose that agents i and k face the following choice set S =
￿
m1;a1;a2￿
where m and a indicate respectively mangos and apples contained in a fruit bas-
ket. Person i prefers mangos to apples but when he/she has to choose by ￿rst
his revealed preference is for
￿
a1￿
. Some hours later, the two friends face a
similar situation. Now, the choice set is given by T =
￿
m1;m2;a1;a2￿
and
4agent i choosing by ￿rst does select
￿
m1￿
: This choice violates a contraction
consistency property (also called property ￿)4 and the weak axiom of revealed
preferences. Hence, it cannot be explained through internal features of the
choice function. Nevertheless, agent i￿ s behaviour can be rationalized using
menø-dependent preferences5 such that
a1 %S
i m1 ^ m1 %T
i a1 for 8S ￿ T
Menø-dependency of %ican be caused by many factors as the desire
to not be greedy, the importance to leave friends all choice opportunities (i.e.
freedom of choice) and go on. ￿
Thus, Sen￿ s researches on rational choice have been focused on what
menø-dependency entails for a well-known result in RCT: the binariness of a
choice function and its generated revealed preference relation. De￿ning a menø-
independent preference relation as a binary relation over an universal set of
alternatives X such that for 8S ￿ X, %S=%X￿S(i.e. %S is exactly the restric-
tion of %Xover S), it may be prooved that menø-independence of % involves
menø-independence of the generated choice function, a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for binariness of choice6. Moreover, menø-dependent preferences en-
tail choices in full contrast with Property ￿￿ s predictments. In these cases,
RCT￿ s reasoning is not able to rationalize behaviour anymore, opening rooms
for contextually embedded choices or choice behaviour strongly in￿ uenced by
causal conditions of choice7.
Exactly dinstinctions between objects and causes of preference have
been deeply investigated in Broome (1994). As this author points out, an ob-
ject of preference tipically is an attainment that may be judged di⁄erently by
di⁄erent agents with divergent causes of preference. In Broome￿ s own words:
[causes of preferences] determine the structure of people￿ s preferences to be di⁄erent
from another￿ s. My preferences are causally in￿ uenced by the life I lead. (Broome,
1994, p.10)
Thus, people￿ s preference structures have to be described using extended
alternatives, that are combinations of attainments together with particular per-
sonal characteristics. Formally, an extended alternative is a couple (x;k) where
4Property ￿ may be formally written as:
[x 2 C (T) ^ x 2 S ￿ T] ) x 2 C (S)
where C is the choice function.
5In what follows strict preference relation and indi⁄erence relations are traditionally de-
￿ned. Furthemore, whenever not di⁄erently speci￿ed preference relations are assumed to be
transitive, re￿exive and anti-symmetric.
6Formal proofs can be found in Sen (1971), Herzberg (1973), Sen (1997).
7Sen also discusses chooser-dependent preferences even if his main results are obtained for
the case of menø-dependency. Worth noting, Sen￿ s view has been strongly in￿uenced by Stig
Kanger￿ s work on background-dependent preferences. On this topic see Sen (1994b).
5x 2 X is the attainment vector and k 2 K a parameter which shortly describes
chooser￿ s characteristics. Thus, an extended preference relation %e is a binary
relation over couples (x;k) 2 X ￿K: Declining k as a subset A of the power set
of X (i.e. k ￿ A ￿ 2X), we may use an extended preference relation for dealing
directly with Sen￿ s menø-dependency. The following example can give us the
basic idea of such an intersection between above approaches.
Example 2: Mango, Apple and Extended Alternatives (Baharad and Nitzam
(2000))
Suppose that the two friends above deal with the following choice prob-
lem. Let S be the choice set with S =
￿
m1;a1;a2￿
and suppose that
m1 ￿i a1 ￿i a2 with C (S;%i) =
￿
a1￿
for 8i
Then, assume that a new choice menø is proposed to both agents. As
above, the new choice set is T =
￿
m1;m2;a1;a2￿
￿ S with C (T;%i) =
￿
m2￿
.
In this case, menø-dependency of preferences can be model using an extended
preference relation such that:
￿
m2;T
￿
￿e ￿
m1;T
￿
￿e
i
￿
a1;T
￿
￿e ￿
a1;S
￿
￿e
i
￿
m1;S
￿
Under such an extended preferences speci￿cation of the problem, positive
appreciation of freedom of choice can cause a substantial changes in agent i￿ s
preference rankings, hence rationalizing apparently irrational choices. ￿
Even if extended preference theory su⁄ers of a deep constitutive prob-
lem linked with, as discussed in Baharad and Nitzam (2000), the simultaneous
satisfaction of a positive (or negative) respect for freedom fo choice (as in ex-
ample 2) and some form of logical compatibility between %i and its extended
version (the so called basedness condition), the recognized signi￿cance of the
distinction between objects and causes of preferences has generated interesting
advancements in the idea that something else than possible attainments may ex-
plain choice behaviour. Causes of preferences may be internally determined (as
personal attitudes, emphatic virtues or individual values) or externally shaped
by social, cultural or moral norms. In any case, taking into account these el-
ements does allow to properly explain behaviour usually not rationalized by
RCT.
An interesting illustration of the last issue can be undertaken consid-
ering Katzner￿ s (2000) recent contribution. Katzner suggests a culturally em-
bedded choice theory starting by the above de￿nition of extended alternatives.
Individual preferences, traditionally characterized, are referred to an extended
choice set S0 (X ￿ K) where X is the universal set of alternatives and K the set
of culturally determined causal conditions of choice. He ￿rstly shows that if a
choice function C de￿ned on S satis￿es property ￿ then always exist an associ-
ated preference relation which rationalizes C (see Theorem 2, p.244). Hence, he
demonstrates that for any non-rationalizable choice function de￿ned on S (X)
6there exist a ￿nite set K together with an associated rationalizable choice func-
tion de￿ned on S0 (X ￿ K) (see Theorem 3, p.248). Roughly speaking, well-
speci￿ed cultural in￿ uences on choice may rationalize what should be viewed as
irrational using RCT￿ s insights.
Behind existance results, Katzner￿ s approach is operatively based on
what he calls a two step procedure:
￿rst [an agent] selects S0 ￿ S then he/she selects as his/her choice from S the most
preferred element of S0. The selection of S0 may be interpreted as an expression of the
primary motive in determining choice action in that it eliminates from consideration
those options that are less attractive, and therefore unacceptable, for cultural reasons.
(Katzner, 2000, p252)
Through this,
by selecting an appropriate context, all choice behaviour is explainable in terms of
rationality as de￿ned by property ￿: (Katzner, 2000, p250, italics added)
Working with choice set contractions Katzner can razionalize apparently
irrational choices through di⁄erent culturally-driven selections of S0 from S: A
slightly modi￿ed version of The Mangos and Apples example may help us in
understanding how the above procedure works.
Example 3: Mangos, Apples and Cultural Norms (Katzner (2000))
Suppose that choice sets are given by S =
￿
m1;a1;a2￿
and T =
￿
m1;m2;a1;a2￿
.
Since, as above, C (S;%i) =
￿
a1￿
and C (T;%i) =
￿
m2￿
property ￿ is violated
and C is a non-rationalizale choice function for RCT. Now consider a culturally
determined vector of individual characteristics given by k = fk1;k2;k3;k4g 2 K
and extended alternatives (x;k) 2 X￿K. Original preferences over alternatives
are supposed to be:
m2 %i m1 %i a1 %i a2
Consistenly, preferences over extended alternatives are given by
￿
m2;kj
￿
%i
￿
m1;kj
￿
%i
￿
a1;kj
￿
%i
￿
a2;kj
￿
for j = 1;2;3;4
with
￿
m2;k2
￿
% i
￿
m1;k1
￿
￿
a1;k3
￿
% i
￿
m1;k1
￿
￿
a2;k4
￿
% i
￿
m1;k1
￿
￿
a1;k3
￿
% i
￿
m2;k2
￿
￿
a2;k4
￿
% i
￿
m2;k2
￿
￿
a2;k4
￿
% i
￿
a1;k3
￿
7Hence, using transitivity it may be shown that the choice function C￿ ratio-
nalized by this ordering is:
C￿ f(￿;kj)g = (￿;kj) with ￿ =
￿
m2;m1;a2;a1￿
and j = 1;2;3;4
C￿ ￿￿
m1;k2
￿
;
￿
a2;k4
￿￿
=
￿
a2;k4
￿
C￿ ￿￿
a1;k3
￿
;
￿
a2;k4
￿￿
=
￿
a2;k4
￿
C￿ ￿￿
m1;k2
￿
;
￿
a1;k3
￿￿
=
￿
a1;k3
￿
C￿ ￿￿
m2;k1
￿
;
￿
a2;k4
￿￿
=
￿
a2;k4
￿
C￿ ￿￿
m2;k1
￿
;
￿
m1;k2
￿￿
=
￿
m1;k2
￿
C￿ ￿￿
m2;k1
￿
;
￿
a2;k4
￿￿
=
￿
a2;k4
￿
C￿ ￿￿
a1;k3
￿
;
￿
m2;k1
￿
;
￿
m1;k2
￿￿
=
￿
a1;k3
￿
C￿ ￿￿
m1;k1
￿
;
￿
a2;k4
￿
;
￿
a1;k3
￿￿
=
￿
a2;k4
￿
C￿ ￿￿
m1;k2
￿
;
￿
a2;k4
￿
;
￿
m2;k1
￿￿
=
￿
a2;k4
￿
C￿ ￿￿
m1;k2
￿
;
￿
a2;k4
￿
;
￿
a1;k3
￿￿
=
￿
a2;k4
￿
C￿ ￿￿
m2;kj
￿
;
￿
m1;kj
￿
;
￿
a2;kj
￿
;
￿
a1;kj
￿￿
=
￿
m2;kj
￿
for j = 1;2;3;4
As Katzner shows, the last function sati￿es property ￿ and choice consistency
is valued on the basis of some cultural norms external to the choice itself. Finally,
C￿ can also be explained in terms of choice set contractions with T0 = T ￿ f￿g
where ￿ is one of the best elements in T. ￿
Noteworthy, Katzner￿ s proposal goes in the direction of a contextu-
ally embedded choice theory which internalizes some external consistency re-
quirments with respect to socially, culturally or positionally determined chooser￿ s
personal characteristics or causal conditions of choice (i.e. moral obligations,
normative principles etc). Such a complex paradigm ought to be able to deal
with menø-dependent, chooser-dependent and positional preferences.
However, this is not the unique path followed by researches in last
decades. Arguments of di⁄erent nature have been presented by several authors
in order to show how a neoclassical (or substantive) view of human rationality
is inadequate to explain real world choice behaviour not completely driven by
self-interested motivations. Let us review these last contributions in order to
better focus our proposal introduced in the following sections.
H.Simon (2000) provides an excellent review of recent philosophical and
methodological appraisals to RCT. He writes in his conclusions:
as human beings are adaptive organisms and social organisms that can preserve
body of learning or being in￿uenced by socially, culturally or positionally determined
norms, values or habits, studying their behaviour will not return us to permanently
invariant laws, for human learning and social in￿ uence will continue to change people￿ s
way of making rational decisions (Simon (2000), p.252, italics added).
8As well-known, Simon has suggested a procedural view of rational be-
haviour specifying how rational choices vary under di⁄erent choice procedures
and di⁄erent notions of what a satisfying choice is8. In what follows, we propose
an alternative approach. Accepting Simon￿ s view that rational human behav-
iour will not return us to permanently invariant laws, individuals are assumed
to be rational maximizers facing some contextually determined constraints or
in￿ uences which change their choice sets structures. Therefore, embedded ra-
tionality is not modeled assuming a given choice structures and some satisfying
procedures designed by the context of choice, but, conversely, assuming cer-
tain social and cultural in￿ uences that may make rational a substantively non-
optimalalternative9 . Hence, our proposal is a theory of contextually-embedded
rationality as Katzner￿ s (2000) one.
Nevertheless, di⁄erently by Katzner, we will not use choice set contrac-
tions but choice sets￿trasformations to model context-dependency of choice.
Contexts of choice are thought not as frames in the sense of Kahneman and
Tversky (1979)10, but, following Elliot and Hayward (1998), as a complex com-
pact within which choice behaviour is considered, selected, interpreted and eval-
uated. Echoing Etioni (1988), we recognize that ￿ most general frames are social
and cultural norms and institutions￿generally actived by context cues which de-
termine what kind of frame of choice actually holds. Ignoring what context cue
activates a relevant frame, our proposal allows to take into account context ef-
fects on choice behaviour. Finally, contextually-embedded rationality here refers
to maximizing behaviour towards higher well being achievements within limits
and obligations imposed by some choice super-structures 11. These structures
operate as formal and/or informal contraints and they are co-determined by cul-
turally speci￿c factors, social and group obligations, norms and ethical values,
personal identities and attitudes. Moreover, their are super-structures since, in
many cases, they are not under direct individual control. A classic dilemma12,
called Sophie￿ s Choice, may be used to illustrate how a choice super-structures
works.
8See Simon (1955), (1972), (1982). Furthermore, an elegant step forward in modeling
procedural rationality has been done by Rubinstein (1998). His choice structure is given by
a triple: a choice set, a decisional procedure and a similarity relation among alternatives
(see p.28). He models choices between lotteries and he shows that some usual criticisms to
RCT (like framing e⁄ects) may be easily reconciled using a procedural approach. Similarly,
Mullainathan (2002) provide a memory-based model of bounded rationaly.
9We will deal with the dinstinction between maximization and optimization in Section 5.
10In their seminal contribution, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) discuss how frames char-
acterized by some re￿ection e⁄ects (like being relatively more (less) risk-adverse after some
past episodes of gains (losses)) a⁄ects choices. For a survey on frames of choice based on
re￿ection e⁄ects see Levin et al. (1996). A recent application of framing e⁄ects in explaining
non-transitive choices can be found in Humphrey (2001).
11We derive our concept of choice super-structure by Folbre￿ s (1994) idea of structures of
contraints. In her own words, ￿individuals are embedded in a complex structure of individual
and collective identities and competing interpretations of these that sometimes they do not
even know whose interests they are acting on￿ (Folbre, 1994, p.16). These elements char-
acterize agents￿structures of constraints within which motivations for action and criteria of
behaviour are embedded.
12The Sophie￿ s Dilemma is discussed in Bailey (1998).
9Example 4: Sophie￿ s Choice
Sophie is a young mother of two twins. A sadistic o¢ cer in a concen-
tration camp proposes her the following alternatives: ￿ choose before night one
of your babies to be killed, or I shall kill them both￿ . A neoclassical chooser
would probably suggest to ￿ ip a coin in order to maximize expected utility.
Nevertheless, at the sunset, Sophie decides for killing both babies and herself.
Indeed, her decision can be viewed as irrational. Nevertheless, it should be also
a contextually-embedded rational choice where peer-group safety is an accepted
value (or a moral contraint). In this case Sophie￿ s behaviour could be rational-
ized as perfectly consistent with her will to signal that ￿ none of us will accept
to gamble with our children￿ . ￿
As we will see below, choice super-structures are modeled through so-
cially or culturally determined choice sets￿transformations which do not nec-
essarly maintain orders among alternatives (named in short allomorphic ap-
plications) as well as through the imposition of equivalence relations between
alternatives previously perceived as not-equivalent13. In order to appreciate how
these are de￿ned, we have to introduce some concepts of poset mathematics.
To this task is devoted the next section.
3 De￿nitions and Notations
Throughout this paragraph, we introduce de￿nitions and notations14. Take
a non-empty, ￿nite set of alternatives X and a binary relation % on X. Suppose
that % is re￿ exive, transitive and anti-symmetric15. Let (X;%) be a ￿nite, non-
empty poset. Whereas each (Z;%) ￿ (X;%) is a closed set, then any Z has a
supremum and an in￿mum element. Traditionally, we can write these using the
following notation:
x ^ y ￿ sup(x;y) (1)
x _ y ￿ inf (x;y)
for some x;y 2 Z. In what follows, symbols _ and ^ are traditionally named
join and meet. There can be also the case that (Z;%) has a top and a bottom
element respectively denoted by | and ?. Ordinary representability of posets
13Sen (1986) discusses invariance requirements of choice. He uses a notion of isoinformation
set to express similarity with respect relevant information. If two alternatives x and y belong
to the same isoinformation set then they must be treated in the same way. Something very
similar to an equivalence relation. He also suggests isomorphic transformations of alternatives
in order to deal with moral identity of alternatives of the kind: if x = y then f (x) = f (y) for
any f 2 F where F is a class of morally equivalent transformations.
14For an introduction to ordered set theory see Davey and Priestley (1990) and Rival (1982).
For its application to preference orderings see Bridges and Metha (1995).
15For x - y with x;y 2 X we mean that q(x ￿ y).
10through Hesse diagrams is also assumed. For illustrative porposes, the following
diagrams depicts ordered choice sets for the mangos and apples example:
[Insert here Figure 1]
Then, let us assume that X has ￿nite lenght l with
l := maxd(m;x) + 1 (2)
where m is a maximal element of X. In this case, we can decompose X in a
l-tuple (L1;:::;Ll) of levels. Each level is a set of alternatives de￿ned as follows:
Lk := fY ￿ Xj 8x;y 2 Y rk(x) = rk(y)g (3)
where we assume that always exists a rank function rk : X ! I+ such that
rk(x) > rk(y) if d(m;x) > d(m;y) and rk(x) = rk(y) + 1 if y covers x.
Hence, let P and Z be two posets. A map ’ : X ! Z is said to be
order-preserving if:
x ￿ y in X then ’(x) ￿ ’(y) in Z (4)
or, alternatively, when
rk(￿ (x)) = rk(x) for 8x 2 X (5)
A one-to-one and onto order preserving map is generally named isomorphism.
Hence, an allomorphic application is a non-order-preserving map ￿ 2 ￿ : X ! Z
such that:
rk(￿ (x)) = ￿ (rk(x)) 6= rk(x) (6)
for at least one x 2 X: The ￿nite, non-empty set Z is simply named induced
poset. Then, an equivalence relation ￿ 2 ￿ on a set Z ￿ X is a re￿ exive,
symmetric and transitive binary relation which gives raise to a partition of Z
into disjoint blocks. A typical block is of the form:
[y]￿ := fx 2 Z j x ￿ y (mod￿)g (7)
11When for all x;y;z;v 2 Z
x ￿ y (mod￿) (8)
z ￿ v (mod￿)
then
x _ z ￿ y _ v (mod￿) (9)
x ^ z ￿ y ^ v (mod￿)
and ￿ is said to be join (resp.meet)-compatible. Finally, we can de￿ne
a choice super-structure as a contextually induced transformation of a poset
through an equivalence relation and/or a non-order-preserving application 16.
Formally, a choice super structure can be de￿ned as:
(mod￿;￿) 2 ￿ [ ￿0 ￿ ￿ [ ￿0 (10)
with ￿0 :=qf￿j￿ 2 ￿gand ￿0 :=qf￿j￿ 2 ￿g: Consistently, the induced poset
is equal to:
Z(mod￿;￿) :=
n
[x](mod￿;￿) for 8x 2 Z
o
(11)
with Z(￿0;￿0) ￿ Z and Z(mod￿;￿) 6= ; for 8(mod￿;￿) 2 ￿ ￿ ￿:
As it will clearer in next sections, the basic idea is that these trans-
formations may be used in modeling contextually embedded choices since they
allow us to describe how choice super-structures e⁄ectively work.Finally, let us
de￿ne the narrowest family of choice super-structures.
Let us call a pure choice super-structure a couple (mod￿;￿) with ￿ 2 ￿
and ￿ 2 ￿ that is a categorial transformation in which both an equivalent re-
lation and an allo-morphic application work. in opposition, if ￿ ￿ ￿0 or ￿ ￿ ￿0
we have impure choice super-structures. These may be divided in two classes:
permutative choice superstructures (i.e. (￿0;￿) 2 ￿0￿￿) and equivalence choice
super-structures i.e. ((￿;￿0) 2 ￿ ￿ ￿0). In the ￿rst class of transformations,
a non-order-preserving map modi￿es alternatives￿ranks, in the second one an
equivalence relation makes contextually equivalent (i.e. on a par) some pre-
viously distinct alternatives. Finally, whereas ￿ ￿ ￿0 and ￿ ￿ ￿0 no choice
superstructures a⁄ect choice behaviour.
16In recent pure mathematics, a category is de￿ned as a combination of an ordered set and
some structure-preserving morphisms. For an introduction to this topic see Blyth (1982).
124 Choice Super-Structures and External Con-
sistency of Choice
We have now almost all theoretical tools to deal with external consistency
of choice. Few additional de￿nitions complete our set-up. Take a non-empty,
￿nite poset of alternatives (X) and denotes with b Z := fZigi2X all non-empty
families of non-empty subsets of X. Assume that there exists a choice function
de￿ned as a map:
C := X !
[
i2X
Zi such that (8i 2 X)C (i) 2 Zi (12)
with Zx := fy 2 Xjy > xg for 8x 2 X. Hence, by the Zorn￿ s Lemma17, any
non-empty family of subsets of X has at least one maximal element. Maximal
elements are de￿ned as follows:
De￿nition 1: Let X be a ￿nite, non-empty poset and let Z ￿ X. Then
a 2 Z is a maximal element of Z whereas if a - x 2 Z then a ￿ x. Moreover,
if a % x for 8x 2 Z then a 2 Z is the (maximum) optimal element of Z.
Thus, consistently with Sen (1971), (1997) and Suzumura (1976), (1983),
we can de￿ne maximal set and optimal set choice functions as follows:
De￿nition 2: Let Z ￿ X be ￿nite, non-empty posets with at least one
maximal element. A maximal set choice function is a map
CM (Z;%) : Z ! M (Z;%)
with M (Z;%) := fxjx 2 Z and @y 2 Z : y ￿ xg.
De￿nition 3: Let Z ￿ X ￿nite, non-empty posets with at least one optimal
element. An optimal set choice function is a map
CB (Z;%) : Z ! B (Z;%)
with B (Z;%) := fxjx 2 Z and 8y 2 Z : x % yg
Trivially, whereas % is assumed complete, Z has a top element (|) and
B (Z;%) ￿ M (Z;%) ￿ (|) as shown in Sen￿ s (1997) Theorem 5.3. Hence, a
set value choice function is non-rationalizable if it does not sati￿es a slightly
modi￿ed version of property ￿: More precisely,
17See Hamilton (1982).
13De￿nition 4: Given Z ￿ X and P ￿ Z ￿ X ￿nite, non-empty posets, the
set-value choice function C is said to be non-rationalizable by % if
C (Z;%) ￿ S 6= ; and (13)
C (P;%) ￿ S
0
6= ; with
S
\
S
0
= ; and S
\
P 6= ;
Example 5 does illustrate our last de￿nition:
Example 5: A Non-Rationalizable Maximal Choice Function
Let Z be a ￿nite, non-empty poset and let P a non-empty subset of
Z. Both sets are characterized by the following Hesse diagrams in which order
relations are traditionally denoted :
[Insert here Figure 2]
Looking at De￿nition 4, CM is non-rationalizable if CM (Z;%) := fx;z;kg
and CM (P;%) := fy;wg. As the reader may easily check, such a situation
phases out in mangos and apples-like choice problems. ￿
As we have discussed above, menø restrictions, cultural norms or po-
sitional obligations may explain apparently irrational choice behaviour. These
contextually determined in￿ uences are modeled using choice super-structures
de￿ned as a categorial transformations (mod￿;￿) of ordered choice sets. For
illustrative pourposes, let us consider, once more, Sophie￿ s tragic choice.
Example 6: Sophie￿ s Choice and Choice Super-Structures
Remind Sophie￿ s choice. Her choice set is given by:
Z = fx;y;zg
with x : save one baby throwing a coin; y : loose both babies; z :kill both
babies and herself. Anyone agrees that outside a concentration camp a nat-
ural order among alternatives should be x ￿ y ￿ z and that CB (Z;%) ￿
CM (Z;%) := fxg. Nevertheless, inside a camp things are tragically di⁄er-
ent. Group-oriented norms of the kind ￿ ...this is a monstrous game ! We
must signal that we do not accept these kind of gamblings￿ may cause that
CB
￿
Z(mod￿￿;￿￿);%
￿
￿ CM
￿
Z(mod￿￿;￿￿);%
￿
:= fzg with
￿
￿ : = fy ￿ x(mod￿)g
￿￿ : =
￿
r(￿ (x)) = r(z)
r(￿ (z)) = r(x)
14Hence, an oppurtunely de￿ned transformation of Sophie￿ s choice set
may explain as heroically rational an apparently irrational choice. Her group
loyalty is an ethical principle able to rationalize what is un-acceptable for a
neoclassical chooser: self-sacri￿ce without personal future rewards. ￿
Following Example 6￿ s intuition, we are able to show the following:
Proposition 1: Let P ￿ Z be non-empty, ￿nite posets, CM a maximal set
choice function and (mod￿;￿) 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ a pure choice super-structure. Then, it
always exists a
(mod￿
￿;￿￿) such that if CM (Z;%) ￿ S 6= ; and CM (P;%) ￿ S0 6= ;
with S \ S0 ￿ ; and S \ P 6= ;
then CM
￿
Z(mod￿;￿);￿
￿
￿ e S with e S ￿ P and
CM (P;%) ￿ S0with S0 \ e S 6= ;
Proof. Suppose that CM is not rationalized by % : By de￿nition, it is true
that r(s) = 0 for any s 2 S and that r(z) > 0 for any z 2 Z ￿ S: Pick any
m 2 ￿ = (Z ￿ S) \ P = P ￿ (S \ P) with r(m) = k > 0: and consider a pure
choice superstructures (mod￿
￿;￿￿) 2 ￿ ￿ ￿:
We have two cases. Let us deal with them separately.
CASE 1: s 6= m(mod￿
￿) for any s 2 S and s = z (mod￿
￿) for some
z 2 Z ￿ S
In this case, take an allo-morphism ￿￿ such that
r(￿￿ (z)) = r(￿￿ (s)) = r(m) and r(￿￿ (m)) = r(s) (14)
Using (14) it is possible to get the following induced poset:
Z(mod￿￿;￿￿) :=
n
[x](mod￿￿;￿￿) for 8x 2 Z
o
with
CM
￿
Z(mod￿￿;￿￿);%
￿
= e S 6= ; and e S ￿ P
Since m 2 ￿ then
CM (P;%) = S0 ￿ ￿ and CM (P;%) \ CM
￿
Z(mod￿￿;￿￿);%
￿
￿ ￿ 6= ;
hence CM is rationalized by an order relation and an opportunely de￿ned
categorial transformation.
CASE 2: s = m(mod￿
￿) for any s 2 S and s 6= z (mod￿
￿) for some
z 2 Z ￿ S
In this case, take simply ￿￿ such that
r(￿￿ (m)) = r(s) and r(￿￿ (s)) = r(s) (15)
Thus, we have that
CM
￿
Z(mod￿￿;￿￿);%
￿
= e S 6= ; and e S ￿ P
15and as above CM can be rationalized using % and (mod￿
￿;￿￿):This con-
cludes the proof.
Proposition 1￿ s insights are prefectly consistent with Katzner￿ s conclu-
sion that all choice behaviour are explainable in terms of condition ￿ once
culturally determined factors are appropriately taken into account. Intuitively,
this ￿nding shows that all non-rationalizable maximal set choice functions can
be rationally explained with respect to some external consistency requirements.
External references of choice are here depicted as choice super-structures which
has to be correctly speci￿ed18. These super-structures can be self-imposed or not
and their e⁄ect is to modify how the choice conditions are perceived and under-
stood. Decoding them, it would be more likely to understand menu-dependent
or background-conditions-dependent choices19. For illustrative purposes, before
moving to the next section, we provide, as an application of Proposition 1, a
quick rationalization of the mangos and apples choice problem.
Example 7: Menu-Dependent Preferences and Choice Super-Structures
Consider the following choice set
Z =
￿
m1;m2;a1;a2￿
with the order structure represented in Figure 1. As discussed above, CM (Z;%) :=
fm1;m2g: Then, take a subset P =
￿
m1;a1;a2￿
with CM (Z;%) \ P :=
￿
m1￿
and ￿ :=
￿
a1;a2￿
. As known, in order to contraddict property ￿ we must have
that CM (P;%) 6=
￿
m1￿
like in the orginal case (see Example 1). Now, let us
imagine the following pure choice super-structure. An equivalence relation of
the kind ￿ given fruits￿ aspect and shape any mango (and any apple) is equivalent
to the other￿is accepted. Formally,
m1 = m2(mod￿
￿)
Furthermore, a kindness-oriented allo-morphism suggests to value other
agent￿ s freedom of choosing what he or she likes more. This modi￿es choice set
structure in the following way:
r
￿
￿￿ ￿
a1￿￿
= r
￿
￿￿ ￿
a2￿￿
= r(m1)
r
￿
￿￿ ￿
m1￿￿
= r
￿
a1￿
= r
￿
a2￿
18In fact, there exixt other conceptions of what external references of choice are. For in-
stance, Sen uses the adjective external referred to anything that drives choices (preference or
utility maximization, well-being maximization, other values and so on) in opposition to inter-
nal features of the process of choice (like contraction or expantion consistency). Di⁄erently,
Gaertner and Xu (1996), (1999) show that di⁄erent choice functions can be rationalized taking
into account di⁄erent external references here interpreted as axioms that a choice function has
to satisfy (precisely properties of path dependency or balanced choice).
19Note that what Sen (1997) calls a permissibility function, in symbol K such that K(S) ￿ S
where S is the option set, might be seen as a special choice super-structure that de￿nes what
is and is not permissible and what is maximal given actual permissibility conditions.
16Hence, using the induced ordered subset Z(mod￿￿;￿￿) it is possible to show
that
CM
￿
Z(mod￿￿;￿￿);%
￿
:= CM (P;%) :=
￿
a1;a2￿
Then, the maximal set value choice function is not rationalizable through
an order relation but choice behaviour can be explained using a well-shaped
transformation of the choice set. ￿
5 Maximization and Optimization
The reader has surely noticed that so far we have only dealt with maxi-
mal set choice functions. Let us now consider which relation occurs between
maximization and optimization in a contextually embedded choice theory. In
his 1997 paper, ￿ Maximization and the Act of Choice￿ , Sen de￿nes relations
between maximizing and optimizing choice behaviour. His main ￿ndings may
be summarized as follows:
(i) main contrasts between maximization and optimization arises from imcom-
pleteness of preference rankings. Where an order relation on a non-empty,
￿nite choice set is complete, re￿ exive and transitive maximal and optimal
sets coincide.
(ii) for partially incomplete preference rankings, any optimal set of alternatives
is a proper subset of the maximal set de￿ned on the same choice set
(iii) any maximization problem can be viewd as an optimization one with re-
spect to an opportunely de￿ned as if order relation. Nevertheless, the
converse is not always true.
On issues (i) and (ii), Quizilbash (2002) rightly notices that Sen￿ s analy-
sis is mainly referred to commensurate alternatives in Broome￿ s (2000) sense20.
Nevertheless, following Gri¢ n￿ s (1986) notion of ￿ roughly equal in value￿op-
tions, alternatives may be on a par, that is being comparable without being
B-commensurable. Hence, Quizilbash de￿nes a ￿ roughly equal in value￿binary
relation %Aas an order relation such that for 8x;y 2 X
x %A y () x and y are comparable and q(y ￿ x) (16)
reformulating Sen￿ s results in terms of %A : His ￿ndings show that any op-
timal set of alternatives with respect to a ￿nite, non-empty choice set and a
20B-commensurability of an order relation involves that for 8x;y 2 X ) x % y and y % x:
17￿ roughly equal in value￿order relation can be exactly replicated by a maximal
set de￿ned on B-commensurate options and a traditionally de￿ned preference
relation. Thus, any maximizing behaviour can be matched to an optimization
exercise taking into account %A and allowing for some degree of incommesura-
bility among alternatives. Hence, roughness has to be read as something in-
eradicably in alternatives themselves which makes us unable to commisurate
di⁄erences among choice options even with more available information or more
penetrating examination21. Roughly equal in value alternatives are options per-
ceived as equivalent and non-commensurable because of their intrinsic nature
(for instance human development dimensions) or the context in which choice
has to be undertaken (as in Sophie Choice-like examples).
Hence, using Quizilbash￿ s insights, equivalence choice super-structure may
be of some help in investigating e⁄ects that contextually determined roughness
among options have on the relation between maximal and optimal choice sets
(point (iii) above).
Let Z ￿ X be ￿nite, non-empty ordered choice sets and ￿ be an equiv-
alence relation de￿ned consistently with some external (to the choice itself)
normative principles, values or norms. Furthermore, let CB
￿
Z(￿;￿0);%
￿
denote
the optimal set choice function whereas an equivalence choice super-structure is
imposed on Z. Using ￿￿ s properties it is possible to prove the following:
Proposition 2: For any ￿nite, non-empty ordered choice set Z ￿ X exists
an equivalence choice super-structure (￿
￿;￿0) 2 ￿ ￿ ￿0 and an induced poset
Z(￿;￿0) ￿ X such that
CM (Z;%) ￿ CB
￿
Z(￿￿;￿0);%
￿
Proof.
Suppose that CM (Z;%) := ￿ := faigi=1;:::;M ￿ Z is the maximal set with
respect to Z. Then, by de￿nition, @c 2 Z such that c ￿ a for 8ai 2 ￿: Hence,
for 8c 2 Z it must be that either c ￿ ai 2 ￿; but then c 2 ￿ or that c ￿ ai 2 ￿
and hence c 2 Z ￿ ￿:
If this is the case, for 8c 2 Z ￿ ￿ and 8ai 2 ￿ it is true that
ai ^ c = ai and ai _ c = c
Take an equivalence choice super-structure (￿
￿;￿0) 2 ￿ ￿ ￿0 such that for
8ai 2 ￿
a1 = ::: = aM (mod￿
￿)
Then, properties of an equivalence relation state that
ai = ai _ a￿i (mod￿
￿) and ai = ai ^ a￿i (mod￿
￿)
21In Sen￿ s (1997) words, we can speak of assertive incompleteness.
18Thus, for any c 2 Z ￿ ￿, it is true that for i = 1;:::;M
[ai ^ a￿i (mod￿
￿)] ^ ai = [ai ^ a￿i (mod￿
￿)] = ai
[ai ^ a￿i (mod￿
￿)] _ c = c
[ai _ a￿i (mod￿
￿)] ^ ai = [ai _ a￿i (mod￿
￿)] = ai
[ai _ a￿i (mod￿
￿)] _ c = c
and then it must be that for any ai 2 ￿
ai % c(mod￿
￿)
Hence, using an order isomorphism f￿￿ : Z ! Z(￿￿;￿0) associated with ￿
￿,
we can de￿ne the following induced poset:
Z(￿￿;￿0) := ff￿￿ (x) for any x 2 Zg
Then
CB
￿
Z(￿￿;￿0);%
￿
:= ￿ = CM (Z;%)
This concludes the proof.
Intuitively, (￿;￿0) may be seen as contextually imposed assertive incom-
pleteness which modify choice set￿ s structure. Noteworthy, it may also viewed
as a binary relation though which roughly equality can be directly de￿ned. As
in Quizilbash￿ s (2002), choice super-structures ensure that any maximizing be-
haviour can be mimicked by an opportunely de￿ned optimizing behaviour with
respect to some ￿ on a par￿alternatives.
The following example illustrates our last result.
Example 8: Equivalence Choice Super-Structures
Suppose that Z := fx;y;z;v;wg with order relations as in Figure 2 (a)￿ s
diagram and that CM (Z;%) := fx;y;zg. Now, let us consider an equivalence
choice super-structure (￿
￿;￿0) 2 ￿ ￿ ￿0 with a related order isomorphism f￿￿
such that
x = y = z (mod￿
￿) and v = w(mod￿
￿)
f￿￿ (x) = f￿￿ (y) = f￿￿ (z) % f￿￿ (v) = f￿￿ (w)
Thus, taking Z(￿￿;￿0) := ff￿￿ (x) for any x 2 Zg, it must be that
CB
￿
Z(￿￿;￿0);%
￿
= CM (Z;%) := fx;y;zg￿
Finally, using Proposition 1 and 2 it is immediate to show that:
Proposition 3: For any ￿nite, non-empty ordered choice set induced by
an equivalence relation ￿
￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿0, exists a pure choice super-structure which
rationalizes not rationalizable optimal set choice functions.
19Proof. Suppose a non-rationalizable optimal set choice function de￿ned on
Z(￿￿;￿0): By Theorem 2, using an inverse isomorphism f
￿1
￿￿ : Z(￿￿;￿0) ! Z and
removing equivalences, we may determine an poset Z ￿ X such that
CB
￿
Z(￿￿;￿0);%
￿
= CM (Z;%)
with CM (Z;%) non-rationalizable by %. But then, by Theorem 1, ex-
ists a pure choice super-structure (mod￿
￿;￿￿) 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ which may rationalize
CM (Z;%) and CB
￿
Z(￿￿;￿0);%
￿
:
6 Intransitive Choices and Permutative Choice
Super-Structures
Let us conclude mentioning what role permutative choice super-structures
have inside our theory. As de￿ned above, a permutative choice super-structure
is a choice set transformation which simply modi￿es alternatives￿ranks at a
given time. As other choice super-structures, it may be due to internalized
moral principles, cultural norms or social in￿ uences. Di⁄erently by other trans-
formations, it is not accompained by an equivalence relation which makes some
options B-incommensurable.
Nevertheless, changing options￿relative rank in agent￿ s choice set, some
choice intransitivities might phase out expecially whereas transitivity is applied
to preferences at a single point of time22. Instrantivity has been ruled out by
RCT since it does not allow preferences￿representability and give raise to the
well-known money pump argument, a reductio ad absurbum which shows that an
intransitive chooser can be made to give up all his money. As argued in Anand
(1993), intransitive agents are seen by "tellers of the money pump story" as
Panglossian fools with contraddicting preference structures of the kind:
a % b, b % c and c % a
Intrasitivity involves that agents are willing to trade c with b paying some
money, b and some wealth for a and again they are willing to give up a for
c paying again. The circle goes on and intransitive agents are pumped dry of
money. Surely, inside RCT money-pump-like-arguments have disruptive e⁄ects.
As Anand recognises, these are mainly consequences of thinking transitivity as
something referred to preferences at a given time. Since the above paradox
is a multi-period example, endogeneous preference changes (Etioni (1985)) or
framing e⁄ects (Kahneman D. and Tversky A. (1984)) cannot be ruled out at
22The same observation can be easily extended to pure choice super-structures. Hence, our
argument has to be applied to those transformations too.
20least whereas a dynamic solution of the paradox is searched. Moreover, he
continues, even a simultaneous explaination of the money pump story cannot
have disastrous consequences as expected. In fact, introducing the notion of
counterfactual connective23 (i.e. an assertive proposition of the kind ￿ if it were
the case that...then the following would happen￿ ) and de￿ning three dinstinct
choice sets Z1 := fa;bg, Z2 := fb;cg, Z3 := fa;cg; intransitive choice may be
rationalized by unexpected changes in choice counterfactuals.
Once more, a slightly modi￿ed version of the mangos and apples exam-
ple can be useful in order to appreciate Anand￿ s argument.
Example 9: Mangos, Apples and The Intransitivity of Choice (Anand
(1993))
During a dinner in a friend￿ s house, some fruits are o⁄ered to our
chooser. If he/she is o⁄ered a mango and a small apple, he/she would choose
to have a mango, and if his/her host proposes a mango versus a big apple,
the choice would be for the latter. Nevertheless, once two apples of di⁄erent
dimensions are o⁄ered, our chooser will opt for the small one, violating transtiv-
ity. This apparently irrational behaviour can be rationalized using a particular
counterfactual connective of the kind ￿ if it were the case that two fruits of dif-
ferent dimensions are o⁄erred, then, if etiquette matters, it would be better to
leave the biggest one to our host￿ . As Anand underlines, it is di¢ cult to judge
such a behaviour as irrational. ￿
Similarities between our approach and Anand￿ s idea of counterfactual
connectives are evident. Moral principles, cultural norms or other contextu-
ally determined external constraints may, via counterfactuals, radically trans-
form chooser￿ s preference ranking, generating intransitive, but not irrational,
behavior24. In our theory￿ s words, the same conclusion can be reached using
permutative choice super-structures which may be seen as functional versions
of counterfactual connectives for ordered choice sets. To see this, let us con-
sider the three choice sets de￿ned above. Whereas preferences are like the
money pump paradox￿ s ones, it is immediate to check that CB (Z1;%) := fag
and CB (Z2;%) := fbg and CB (Z3;%) := fcg. In the last case, intransitiv-
ity of choice can be explained de￿ning a permutative choice super-structure
(￿0;￿￿) 2 ￿0 ￿ ￿ such that
￿￿(r(a)) = r(c)
￿￿(r(c)) = r(a)
which may be semantically declined invoking etiquette.
23For an analysis of counterfactuals see Lewis (1986).
24Anand (1987) discusses under which conditions a transitive description of an intransitive
behaviour can be given. His suggestion is to introduce more complex choice primitives than
simple and static order relations. Exactly counterfactuals may works well for these porposes.
217 Final Remarks
In this essay, we have proposed a possible direction for extending RCT us-
ing some concepts of poset mathematics. Speci￿cally, following Sen￿ s work on
rationality, we have dealt with the issue of how the context of choice may af-
fect choice behaviour through culturally, socially or positionally imposed norms,
principles or values. As we have seen, using equivalence relations, isomorphisms
and allo-morphic applications, it is possible to explain chooser-dependent pref-
erences, menø-dependent preferences as well as it is relatively straightforward
relating optimizing and miximizing behaviour. Hence, some starting elements
for a contextually-embedded choice theory (which takes into account self imposed
constraints, permissible behaviour given some cultural and social norms, values,
chooser￿ s identity, preferences￿assertive incompleteness and intransite choices)
do emerge. Surely, these tools have to be further developed (even using di⁄er-
ent analytical frameworks) in order to reach a full account of what behaviour,
within in￿ uencing groups, communities or informal networks, may be valued
as a rational. Our proposal is a ￿rst attempt to internalise in the economic
discourse contextually-provided criteria of rational behaviour. This seems us
consistent with what recently reminded by Lukes (2000):
rational behaviour not only must possess internal criteria of truth and logic, but
also it has to be related with contextually-provided criteria, specifying which beliefs and
behaviour may acceptably go together and accoding to which beliefs may count as true
or false, meaningful or non-sensical, appropriate or inappropriate in the circumstances,
soundly or unsoundly reached, properly or improperly held and, in general, based on
good or bad actions (Lukes (1970), p.263).
Contextually-provided criteria of rationality may easily explain sec-
ond/third best choice behaviour, as shown by Katzner (2000), but they also
could play a role in the understanding of dynamically inconsistent behaviours
through description of how frames of choice are evolved. Case-based reasoning
and decision can be easily approached as well, specifying which context cues are
in action and what frame of choice they determine.
Obviously, some vagueness in this approach is not avoidable. The reason
of this is twofold. On the one hand, di⁄erent descriptions or perceptions of the
same context of choice can co-exist as well as choosers￿identities and attitudes
may be re￿ ected in di⁄erent choice super-structures. On the other hand, the
same social, cultural or positional norm or factor may be di⁄erently internalized
by individuals as well as individuals￿behaviour can be in￿ uenced by some cul-
tural, social or positional values instead of others. Using Sen￿ s expressions, our
theory puts identity before reason and not reason before identity as RCT does
(Sen (1999)). Moreover, his vagueness introduces rooms for a non-mechanical
approach to rationality (Sen (1985)): choice super-structures as well as social
relations or cultural in￿ uences must be decoded and understood case by case,
22individual by individual. Suited-for-all criteria of rationality (as property ￿ or
the axioms of revealed preferences) are automatically ruled out.
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